This paper explores the question of the empirical in the context of its related notion of experience, inasmuch as the latter explicitly brings into play issues about subjectivity. The paper focuses directly on the ideas of the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben concerning infancy and experience, voice and speech, and bare life and politics. In doing so, an argument is made that questions Agamben's recourse to a particular form of linguistic model and makes evident the limitations that such a model poses for an understanding of significant transformations in modern forms of sovereignty regarding the socio-political articulation of highly domesticated voices. The paper intends to provide some sociological and social theoretical ground for a consideration of the voice of infancy in contemporary forms of biopolitical sovereignty. In doing so, the paper suggests that infancy is more than a figuration of experimentation, inasmuch as its voice (hovering between babble and the comprehensible) may resonate across an empirical domain, which is reconfigured through such a voice (or voices) heard, taken seriously and touching others.
Infancy and Experience: Voice, Politics, and Bare Life

Introduction
The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in his Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) , presents the following image of a 'secret solidarity' between international humanitarian organisations and sovereign state power:
It takes only a glance at the recent publicity campaigns to gather funds for refugees from Rwanda to realize that here human life is exclusively considered... as sacred life -which is to say, as life that can be killed but not sacrificed -and that only as such is it made into the object of aid and protection. The 'imploring eyes' of the Rwandan child, whose photograph is shown to obtain money but who 'is now becoming more and more difficult to find alive,' may well be the most telling contemporary cipher of the bare life that humanitarian organizations, in perfect symmetry with state power, need. (1998:133-4) Although, for Agamben, this image leads to his commenting on the contemporary status of 'the refugee' in the context of international human rights and transformations in national sovereignty, for me in this paper it is Agamben's invocation of the infant (the child, literally unable to speak, here subtracted by the photographic image, and reduced to a demand to be looked at) that is the significant point of focus. In Homo Sacer, which I shall discuss more later in the essay, Agamben talks about the failure to heal the gap between zoe (simple life) and bios (a way of life) and between voice (phōnē) and speech (logos). He argues that: 'Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception, that is, as something that is included solely through an exclusion ' (ibid: 11) . To phrase it simply here, the Rwandan child, as muted bare life, is included within the geo-politics of humanitarian aid, regional development and human rights intervention, only inasmuch as it is excluded absolutely from that sphere of influence. The presence of the For Agamben the problematic of bare life and the logic of the exception is intimately tied to 'the idea of an inner solidarity between democracy and totalitarianism' (ibid: 10) and to the fact that 'this idea alone will make it possible to clear the way for the new politics, which remains largely to be invented ' (ibid: 10-11) . Notwithstanding the hubris of resting such monumental change on a single idea, my paper engages with the political ideas of Agamben with respect to a series of questions about political voice, experience and the biopolitical. I argue that: a) the formulation above, regarding bare life and the form of the exception, is linked to Agamben's earlier work, from 1978, on infancy, such that infancy is figured as 'the transcendental experience of the difference between language and speech, which first opens the space of history ' (2007: 60) ; b) if we are to surpass the stale ground that Agamben re-presents and hopes to move beyond, then a rethinking of the relation between infancy, experience and political voice is necessary; c) the structural model of language hinders an understanding of infant speech that might be mobilised as politically transformative; and, d) the Aristotelian distinctions between voice/speech and household/state (which are central to Agamben's formulation of biopolitical sovereignty) do not properly stand up to the weight of contemporary sociological knowledge and demand to be rethought in that sociological and social theoretical context. For Agamben, there is an intimate connection between experience and experimentation. In that sense, he works in the context of the longstanding and etymological linkage from 'empirical' to 'experience' (the one ancient Greek, the other roughly its Latin translation) mediated by the term 'experiment'. In modern social thought the empirical tends to refer to that which is observed, whereas experience tends to refer to that subjective process of observing or to the subjective relationality to an external (in a very broad sense) world. Experimentation is the process through which experience of an observed world can be transformed into knowledge. Hence the significance of trial and error in an understanding of modern science. For modern science, Agamben argues, experimentation is a methodologically disciplined form of experience. Of course, a significant aspect of modern philosophical thought has concerned the epistemological question as to whether knowledge of the world must be only through experience (i.e. empiricism) or whether it is possible to construct knowledge through a priori concepts. This genealogy of modern philosophy, and Kant's role within it, plays a significant subtext for Agamben's writing on infancy and experience.
For Agamben then, (who elaborates and deconstructs a version of this narrative), 'experience' (as that which might name a 'subjective', simple and pure, relation to the empirical) is problematised through an understanding of the constitution of the subject in language. And yet, as we will see, experience is not only mediated by language, but the fact of such mediation posits infancy as that which stands before language. Infancy becomes, for Agamben, the primary figuration of the empirical. For Agamben then, there is a problem with positing experience of an empirical world as if such experience were existent prior to language. Infancy provides a way of understanding experience in the context of a linguistic constitution of the subject. In Agamben's writing, though, infancy is somewhat ambivalent, both a synonym for experimentation and yet also referring to the infant as that upon which language is acquired. It is this ambivalence that is also played out in his later work on biopolitical sovereignty. Notably, Agamben's understanding of bare life (which is, I argue, in many ways a synonym for infancy) provides an equivalent ambivalence (as it were, both relation and substance).
Thus, for me in this paper, the question of the infant voice is one that opens up the issue of the empirical by refiguring infancy not as passive, but as the active articulator of experience and the empirical. I turn to contemporary sociological research (as a provocation, rather than as something which is simply a posteriori) that might support and nurture such an infant voice. That in itself raises significant questions about the epistemological status of sociological as against philosophical knowledge. Nevertheless, whereas Agamben steadfastly construes a solidarity across democratic and totalitarian political systems and an antinomy, almost, between bare life (zoe) and a form of life (bios), on the one hand, and voice (phone) and political speech (logos), on the other, as constituted at a 'historico-philosophical level', we will endeavour to hold these ideas to sociological thought and social theory, not least in the context of research on infancy, experience and voice. In the paper I initially discuss Agamben's writing on infancy and experience. I locate this work in the context of the semiology of Saussure and the development of semantics by Benveniste and suggest a rethinking of Agamben's structural linguistic model. I then turn to Agamben's discussion of political voice and bare life and discuss the reiteration of this structural linguistic model. Finally, I
look to contemporary sociological research on children's voice in the context of questions about the 'democratisation of the family' in order to suggest a rethinking of Agamben's thoughts on sovereignty and political voice.
Infancy and Experience
Agamben, in 'Infancy and History: An Essay on the Destruction of Experience' (originally published in 1978), provides a historico-philosophical engagement with formulations of the relationship between experience and subjectivity primarily from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. Central to his argument is an understanding of infancy as a condition of possibility for the human linguistic subject and for the articulation of experience within and by that subject. Thus, for example, his discussion of the Symbolist poets does not simply repeat an understanding of the child's infancy inasmuch as its freshfaced interaction with the world provides the promise of novel interpretation, clarity, and criticism.
1 Rather, he argues that 'modern poetry from Baudelaire onwards is seen to be founded not on new experience, but on an unprecedented lack of experience' (Agamben, 2007: 47 Alexander, 1966) , Agamben is able to be critical of the mathematical and geometric model of the ego that has survived from Descartes, to locate transcendental subjectivity within language, and yet also to problematise any collapse of the transcendental and the linguistic (ibid.: 50-1). He argues that 'it is in language that the subject has its site and origin, and that only in and through language is it possible to shape transcendental apperception as an "I think"' (ibid.: 51).
It is through the work of the French linguist Émile Benveniste, though, that
Agamben properly develops his ideas about infancy, experience and the transcendental. 'Subjectivity', he says, 'is nothing other than the speaker's capacity to posit him or herself as an ego, and cannot in any way be defined through some wordless sense of being oneself, nor by deferral to some ineffable psychic experience of the ego, but only through a linguistic I transcending any possible experience' (ibid.: 52). The particularity of the pronoun 'I', Benveniste argues, cannot be defined with reference to a concept of 'I' nor with reference to the ownership of that pronoun by a particular person speaking (in the sense that that pronoun may be used by any person) (Benveniste, 1966) . Agamben argues that:
Only on this basis does it become possible to pose the question of experience in unequivocal terms. For if the subject is merely the enunciator, contrary to what Husserl believed, we shall never attain in the subject the original status of experience: 'pure, and thereby still mute experience'. On the contrary, the constitution of the subject in and through language is precisely the expropriation of this "wordless" experience; from the outset, it is always "speech". A primary experience, far from being subjective, could then only be what in human beings comes before the subject -that is, before language: a "wordless" experience in the literal sense of the term, a human infancy, whose boundary would be marked by language. (Agamben, 2007: 54 this single language and, in order to speak, has to constitute himself as the subject of language -he has to say I' (ibid.: 59). The constitution of the subject in language presumes a splitting between language as system and speech as parole (or, in Benveniste's terms, between the semiotic and the semantic), between the voice of nature and the speech of social organisation.
Agamben declares:
It is the fact of man's infancy (in other words, in order to speak, he need to be constituted as a subject within language by removing himself from infancy) which breaks the closed world of the sign and transforms pure language into human discourse, the semiotic into the semantic. Because of his infancy, because he does not speak from the very start, man cannot enter into language as a system of signs without radically transforming it, without constituting it in discourse. (ibid.: 63)
The human is the 'animal deprived of language and obliged, therefore, to receive it from outside himself' (ibid.: 65); language, in this sense, always has a relation of exteriority to human subjectivity.
The splitting between language and discourse (between the semiotic and the semantic) for Agamben, introduces the possibility of human history and experience. Animals reside in a world of semiotic signals, whereas humans inhabit a realm of interpretation and dialogue. Agamben reads Benveniste such that animals are trapped within a domain of the semiotic, a pure system of language; in contrast, humans, because they learn a language and because they come to inhabit a language after their birth, constitute a splitting between an abstracted semiotic system (for Saussure, langue) and a semantic world of speech and dialogue (for Saussure, parole) (see Benveniste, 1966 and 1974) . 3 These two domains, the semiotic and the semantic, though, for Benveniste, are distinct and incommunicable; as Agamben, quoting Benveniste, says 'A moat separates them' (Agamben, 2007: 63) ; they are 'two transcendental limits which define and simultaneously are defined by man's infancy' (ibid: 63-4). For Benveniste, the translation of a semiotic order from one language to another (i.e. from one national linguistic system to another) is impossible; and yet, it is certainly possible to translate the semantics from one language to another (see Benveniste, 1966) . For
Agamben, a semiotic order -an order in which the animal resides -is defined as a natural order, 'the pure pre-babble of nature' (ibid.: 64). Moreover, he argues that '[t]he semantic does not exist except in its momentary emergence from the semiotic in the instance of discourse, whose elements once uttered, fall back into pure language, which reassembles them in its mute dictionary of signs' (ibid.: 64). Agamben asserts that the 'phoneme' (following Roman
Jacobson's analysis) enables 'the passage from the semiotic to the semantic', from signs to words, as Benveniste would say (ibid.: 67). Phonemes, for
Agamben, reside in 'the correspondence-difference (in the chōra, as Plato would have said)' (ibid.: 67). It is because human beings do not have language from the start of their life, Agamben argues, that when they come to speak (when they enter into language from the outside, but with the propensity to do so from the inside) they transform language such that it becomes also discourse (in Benveniste's sense), dialogue, and interpretation.
The splitting of language by virtue of the fact of infancy is compensated by the passage of phonemes (sound images, but also sound objects), such that the two sides of the split are able to resonate in harmony (ibid.: 66). Agamben Moreover, what is experienced in the experimentum linguae is not 'an impossibility of saying', but 'an impossibility of speaking from the basis of a language' (ibid.: 8). But whereas in his earlier essay the gap between voice and speech, animal and human, semiotic and semantic, language and discourse was able to be translated through the capacity of the phoneme to travel from one to the other, to make possible a mutual resonance, in this 'Preface' the distance between the two sides is not able to be sutured. The two sides of the binary are not able to be articulated; there is only an empty space or limit; and yet it is that emptiness that constitutes, for Agamben, the possibility of an ethics. Moreover, he says, in this context, this empty space is a consequence of man finding himself in language without a voice (ibid.: 9-11).
Problems with Agamben's Linguistic Model
Agamben's re-location of the transcendental within language and his understanding of infancy as that which provides a transcendental experience of the difference between language and discourse, or between the semiotic and the semantic, needs to be questioned with respect to the form of
Agamben's linguistic model and to the assignment of language to human infants. Agamben's linguistic model is derived in parts from Saussure and from Benveniste. 4 I will focus primarily on the latter. For Benveniste the human condition is essentially defined by a faculty of symbolisation (and in that respect he comes out of a well-established philosophical and social scientific tradition, see for example Vandenberghe, 2001) . The symbol makes possible the formation of a concept with respect to a concrete object; it makes possible representation, abstract thought, and knowledge (Benveniste, 1996: 26 (Benveniste, 1996: 27) . Moreover, whereas humans have culture, which Benveniste understands (following LeviStrauss) in the context of prohibition, animals do not (Benveniste, 1996: 30) . 5 Agamben readily accepts this understanding of language as primarily symbolic, but he also interprets Benveniste's distinction between the form of language and its function -namely, the distinction between language and discourse, or between the semiotic and the semantic -in the context of a fundamental metaphysical division between the human and the animal.
Benveniste, though, is adamant that animals do not have a language as such;
bees, for example, do not have the capacity to formulate and interpret a sign (1966: 60) . But for Agamben, the ego cogito is transposed onto the field of language (to be expressed as a linguistic expression), not because human language is a priori distinct from animal language, but rather only inasmuch as animals only live within one form of language (the semiotic), whereas humans (as a consequence of human infancy) live with the two sides of language, both its form and its function (both the semiotic and semantic). And yet (overand-above any question as to whether Benveniste's writings actually facilitate such a reading) in this formulation by Agamben the semiotic as 'the pure prebabble of nature' -as that which is shared with the animal -loses its animality, its physicality in the moment of its becoming human, in the moment of its non-articulation with the semantic. 6 In Agamben's discussion, the notion of a 'pure language' (the semiotic) is asked to do too much work. On the one hand, it refers to something comparable to Saussure's notion of linguistic system (langue) and to Benveniste's understanding of the correlation of linguistic system and society; and yet, on the other, inasmuch as it is applied to animals, it is seen as akin to the indivisible cry of nature.
This issue raises the important question, if we take Agamben partly at his word but against his intent, as to whether the 'thing of language' should be read more in terms of its physicality than its symbolics. If the phoneme is able to offer a moment of resonance between the semiotic and the semantic, the signal and the symbol, the natural and the cultural, as Agamben argues, then it must be on account of its ability to touch both orders, but also on account of it being of both orders; Agamben says that there must be 'a mediating element which enables the two systems to resonate ' (2007: 66) . It is important for Agamben that this mediating element does not fix the two systems (in the sense of locking them into place, into a static existence) and, in that sense, any mediation is subject to a fundamental contingency. Agamben foregrounds the importance of considering the ontology of this mediating element, which he then discusses in terms of its topology as a 'historico-transcendental region', namely infancy (ibid.: 67). The phoneme is both a-signifying and signifying; as semiotic it is 'recognised' and as semantic it is 'comprehended'.
In the passage across the two orders, the mediating element, the phoneme, itself must transform (as it were from sound object to sound image), such that phoneme (as sound image) within the order of discourse (semantics, parole)
is properly symbolic and yet holds in the phoneme-as-symbol (as it were) the resonance of the sound object. In this sense, a relation in praesentia is not defined a priori by an abstraction, but only by virtue of the actual elements present and contiguously connected.
Equally, although Foucault, in his The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) , foregrounds 'discursive formation', discourse is that which is able to mediate between 'words' and 'things'. Moreover, his understanding of a discursive formation is such that it understands that formation in terms of the contingent collection of statements, in terms, that is, not of linguistic structure (langue) as the condition of possibility for particular speech acts, but of the conditions of existence of the particular formation of statements (Foucault, 1972) . For us here, if we accept the centrality of infancy to an understanding of language and experience, then this would imply a re-conceptualisation of the relation between infancy and experience not as a transcendental, but through the particular contiguously formed conditions of existence of this coupling. The fact of history, in this reformulation, would certainly be removed from this equation as an internal consequence and made to act both internally and externally.
Opening the question of infancy to socio-historical contingency would undoubtedly imply a demand not simply to be critical of an a priori division between the human and animal (inasmuch as the animal is both external to the human and the infant-animal within), but to consider the apparatuses through which specific formations of language are distributed across humans.
Thus, there would be a demand to understand infancy within, for example, the emergence and growth of a literary culture (both commercial and pedagogic) for children from the seventeenth century onward and the institutionalisation of governmental regimes concerning literacy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The historical ascription of language to children, or the distribution of language across both adults and children, exposes the lie that language is a right of birth. The history and sociology of childhood provide one such site from which we can see how that which has been seen as animal and akin to animal (inasmuch as the infant has been seen as pre-human and pre-social) might be ascribed both language and subjectivity and also importantly how such a subjectivity has been construed as experiential. In that sense, if we read Agamben sociologically -and such that 'language' is not a social universal, but a historically and socially specific array of practices and technologies (Hunter, 1984) -then 'infancy' may provide the transcendental experience of the relation between language and discourse, voice and speech, but only inasmuch as that position is akin to Foucault's historical a priori (Foucault, 1972) .
Politics and Voice Agamben returns, in Homo Sacer (written in 1995), to Aristotle's distinction, in
The Politics, between voice (phōnē) and speech (logos) -such that although all animals have the capacity to voice pain and pleasure, only humans through speech can discuss ethics and justice and, moreover, through speech a political community can be formed in the city. 8 it is one predicated on substitution, but such that that which is substituted maintains a presence in its absence. For Agamben, this substitution provides the basis for an understanding of the logic of sovereignty (inasmuch as the sovereign stands both inside and outside the law) and for a life within it; for Agamben, the analogy between living being with life and with voice and the subsequent substitution is understood in terms of the metaphysical underpinning of Western politics: 'There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion' (ibid.: 8). 9 The form of the exception, as an inclusive exclusion is more than a simple substitution. Although Agamben looks to ancient forms of juridical discourse to understand the logic of the exception as bare life and as life abandoned or under a ban, he often returns to a structural understanding of language as a fundamental point of explanation. Thus, he presents the following analogy:
As the pure form of relation, language (like the sovereign ban) always already presupposes itself in the figure of something nonrelational, and it is not possible either to enter into relation or to move out of relation with what belongs to the form of relation itself. This means not that the nonlinguistic is inaccessible to man but simply that man can never reach it in the form of a nonrelational and ineffable presupposition, since the nonlinguistic is only ever to be found in language itself. (1998: 50) Language, and by structural analogy the law, 'presupposes the nonlinguistic as that with which it must maintain itself in a virtual relation (in the form of a langue or, more precisely, a grammatical game, that is, in the form of a discourse whose actual denotation is maintained in infinite suspension) so that it may later denote it in actual speech ' (ibid: 1998: 20) . Equally, then, 'the Language is the sovereign who, in a permanent state of exception, declares that there is nothing outside language and that language is always beyond itself. The particular structure of law has its foundation in this presuppositional structure of human language. It expresses the bond of inclusive exclusion to which a thing is subject because of the fact of being in language, of being named. To speak [dire] is, in his sense, always to 'speak the law', ius dicere. (ibid: 21)
The virtual relationality of 'pure language' and 'pure law' is a structural relationality that contains within itself, so Agamben argues, the condition of possibility for all particular acts of speech and law. Whereas in 'Infancy and For example, in the late 1990s, research by Carol Smart and her colleagues paved the way for substantial re-conceptualisation of the family, specifically with regard to children after parental separation or divorce. Smart looked not only to the adults, but to the children as well. 12 She argues that '[t]reating children as reflexive social actors is more than a theoretical perspective, for it raises questions about the whole tenor of child-adult relationships' (Smart et al, 2001: 14) . Importantly, the shift in conceptual and methodological thinking that Smart and her colleagues invoked was such that the family members could no longer be presumed to 'think or feel the same way, or that their interests and identities [could be] merged within an inseparable or tightly integrated unit ' (Smart et al, 2001: 18) .
In other words, this approach eschews the tendency towards children's familialization... for it grants conceptual autonomy to individual family members. Within this formulation, then, children need no longer be invisible; they emerge as fully fledged family members, actively engaged in negotiating their own family practices and relationships. They no longer just belong to families; as reflexive agents of their own lives they are part of the creation of families. (Smart et al, 2001: 18) This perspective falls on the significance of the child's voice and in this way the research of Smart and her colleagues is symptomatic of other research that pays attention to children, not simply as agents, but as speaking subjects. violence' (Giddens, 1998: 93) . He constructs the democratic family as a policy ideal and objective. It is one which seeks to accommodate changes in family forms (such as, non-heterosexual families or 'fragmented' families), but also to recognise the importance of family in the stability of children's lives (e.g.
children are seen to grow up more psychologically secure, better able to achieve academic success, more confident in sexual and social relationships within the framework of constant non-conflictual co-parenting relations). 14 The democratic family is one predicated on emotional and sexual equality, mutual rights and responsibilities, co-parenting, life-long parental contracts, negotiated authority over children, obligations of children to parents and socially integration (Giddens, 1998: 95) . to classical democracy, then, it is that modern democracy presents itself from the beginning as a vindication and liberation of zoē, and that it is constantly trying to transform its own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to speak, the bios of zoē' (Agamben, 1998: 9) . Contemporary sociology, then, is able to provide different accounts of how the bare life of the infant can be helped to speak through the support of others (not least those aligned with the authority of the state). In doing so, the 'relations' of both epistemology and sovereignty may appear to be in transformation. To speak as a child is not to usurp the authority and power of the father; political voice is not a matter of subtraction.
To construct children as an experiential subject is to construct them with speech (i.e. to undo the claim that others have had of them in formation of dialogue -speech and counter-speech). Clearly the empirical implications of this are much more than this single essay can address.
Conclusion
There are, then, some significant issues to consider. c) But although Agamben has recourse to a structural model of language, we suggest that a model of discursive practice or semiotic relationality that foregrounds relations of contiguity is one that is able both to present the important concerns that are raised by Agamben, but also suggest a historico-sociological way forward. Understanding the relation between infancy and experience as a condition of existence, rather than condition of possibility, constitutes the problem as particular to a particular episteme that we have not surpassed. This is a sociological problem -regarding, in part, the distribution of communicative entitlements to children, the sites and conditions under which they may speak, and the authority with which such speech may be endowed -rather than a purely historico-philosophical one. problems of drawing on Heidegger and Benveniste in formulating an account of human subjectivity (Calarco, 2007) . 6 Agamben frames this problematic differently in The Open (2004).
7 Of course, Benveniste has none of this and simply talks about 'phonemes' with respect to the semiotic and 'words' in the context of semantics.
8 It is curious why in this later work the question of infancy is little to be found. And yet the infant constitutes an exemplary figure of bare life, representing both that which is within the household and (for example, in the figure of the abandoned child or even in the discourse of child socialisation) that which is external to the polis (see for example Agamben, 1998: 105) .
The infant (and mother and slave), both animal and human, is quintessentially the object of paternal power. 9 We could add, following this logic, that there is politics because 'man' separates and opposes himself to infancy as that inclusive exclusion; namely, the polis is defined through a constitution of maturity, but where infancy is figured as the liminal and limit figure of experimentation and experience. But we are certainly wary of such a move in this essay.
10 I do so not in the sense that there might be perceived an opposition between historicophilosophical knowledge as abstract and formalistic and historico-sociological knowledge as concrete and substantive. 11 Agamben says that:
Every attempt to rethink the political space of the West must begin with the clear awareness that we no longer know anything of the classical distinction between zoē and bios, between private life and political existence, between man as a simple living being at home in the house and man's political existence in the city. (1998: 187) But for Agamben the zone of indistinction is ultimately linked to 'the camp'. We would certainly question, without denying its significance, such a reduction. The discourse of gender and feminism is remarkably absent in Agamben's discussion. 12 In doing so, she helped to put flesh on the legal structure set in place by the Children's Act of 1989 in the UK that legally provided for children to have some kind of voice in matters that affect their lives. (Pryor and Emery, 2004: 171) .
14 For Giddens, these new family forms are symptomatic of the increasing importance of the self as a reflexive project, as one guided toward self-actualisation, as one formed through relationships of mutual self-disclosure and one formed through a concern for self-fulfilment (Giddens, 1991: 125) . But also importantly these personal relationships and this formation of the self are constructed through relations at a distance. These are relations that are not predicated on the centrality of place, but on the disembedding of self and social relations from place and their stretching across space and time in abstract, mediated systems. What was once thought of as the hearth of the family -intimacy and community -are disembedded from their household location and distributed across space and time. Of course, modern communications help to facilitate such disembedding. Thus, where once we might have conflated family, home and household, we are now more circumspect about such prejudices. 15 The difference between Smart et al's and Giddens' formulations here is clear: whereas Smart et al construe children's voices as a form of independence from 'the family', Giddens seems to confine their voices within 'the family', albeit now reformed and democratic. The migration across or the security of the boundary between household and state is crucial here in understanding children's voice and experiential being. 16 It is surprising that Foucault, in his lectures on psychiatric power in 1973, talks about a system of sovereignty within the family (namely through the authority of the patriarch) in contrast to wider disciplinary shifts in society, but also in the sense that such familial sovereignty acts as the mechanism that links individual family members and the family as a whole to modern forms of governmentality (i.e. discipline) (Foucault, 2006: 80-7) . This is surprising because it is precisely with the emergence of modern forms of the family in the nineteenth century that we begin to see the individualisation of family members, precisely as constructed through forms of disciplinary power and knowledge. In this sense, then, we might construe any sovereignty of the family (namely, as a democratic unit, a discrete sovereign territory ruled by its people, the family members) as a simulacra maintained through the workings of government that holds individual family members (both adults and children) as accountable within the terms and conditions of contemporary and institutionalised forms of 'democracy'. Thus, the question is not whether the family is democratic, but who and in what context is the family, and importantly children, demanded to be democratic, to speak for themselves and to be held to account. Such an understanding, albeit not wanting to be critical of recent progressivist moves (hence unlike Lasch and Donzelot), would certainly wonder whether the demand for children to have a voice is an obligation within a relay of authorities out of their control and not necessarily in support of their interests. As Pryor and Emery state, 'children often do not want to make decisions about adult matters, even when they are deeply affected by them. In our zeal for recognizing the rights of children we may overinterpret their desire to have a voice in family matters' (Pryor and Emery, 2004: 171) . This implies having a high degree of sensitivity to children's 'voices' that does not construct an obligation to be responsible. They argue that:
Children often seem to understand that responsibility is the corollary of rights. Young children especially are clear that they do not want to be responsible for major decisions at these times [of divorce]. It may be, then, that adults are well advised to provide a scaffolding structure for children within which they are enabled to foster, maintain, and abstain from relationships as far as possible... to create and maintain an atmosphere... within which children can exercise agency in creating their own relationship network and identity. (Pryor and Emery, 2004: 186) .
Contemporary forms of governmentality of families, then, needs not simply to address the parent as the relay of sovereignty, but to address individual family members, namely in our case children, in a manner that allows the interlocutor not only to speak, but also to stay silent, to have some control (whether actively or passively) over the conditions of communication and the relations of government.
